CVE-2026-99312: KVM Guest-to-Host Escape

(terra.security)

119 points | by Kozmik1 2 hours ago ago

67 comments

  • praseodym an hour ago

    The blog post is very difficult to read, I suspect that unfortunately it’s fully written by an LLM.

    • xlayn an hour ago

      doesn't change the value of what's writen, if true and actionable that's all that should be needed

      • manbash 16 minutes ago

        It has "potential", not "value".

        Also in this case, a "missed potential" if it eventually fails to reach anyone.

      • sylos 28 minutes ago

        Value is more than just iron something is made from. How it's shaped and presented is just as important

        • tptacek 12 minutes ago

          No, it is not "just as important" as the underlying information.

      • drum55 an hour ago

        If it was valuable a human would have been able to communicate it in a few lines of text. Using a LLM to blast slop devalues everything and communicates little. A drunken twitter rant has more ability to convey information than sloppy blog posts with 3 pieces of information per sentence and a load bearing attitude.

        • Ylpertnodi 10 minutes ago

          Get hip to it, daddy-o.

        • cluckindan 39 minutes ago

          Just ask the clanker to read it buddy, you’re already behind /s

      • catlifeonmars 19 minutes ago

        It kind of does, the OP could have just saved themselves the tokens and posted a 130 word summary on x/twitter that would have been just as useful.

      • InsidiousWombat 7 minutes ago

        well it's 404 now

    • Betelbuddy an hour ago

      The LLMs find the security issues, the LLMs will write the reports and the LLMs will fix and patch them.

      I guess its time for all of us to step aside, leave space for somebody who knowns what they are doing, and go fishing...

      • praseodym an hour ago

        And this way only LLMs can learn from these vulnerabilities, making it even more likely that the next one will be found by an LLM.

        • catlifeonmars 17 minutes ago

          LLMs currently don’t learn, at least in the way most people mean, but I assume you mean the trainers will incorporate the knowledge in future releases.

    • biotechbio an hour ago

      Glad to see this is the top comment. This is written by Claude, I know because I talk to Claude for 8+ hours a day, and it says stuff like this. I stopped reading the article because of it.

  • jacobgold 2 hours ago

    Our infrastructure will become so much more secure but we're in for a bumpy ride through 2027.

    • dvh 2 hours ago

      Not necessarily. Only if you assume that no new insecure code is added. If ai found 1 security bugs in old code but ease of code generation with ai adds 2 new security issues (in unrelated code), then we are getting less secure.

      • tyingq an hour ago

        Is it a given that it's as good at outputting secure code as it finding insecure code? That leaves a fair amount of room for people not baking in deep review steps. Also mentioned elsewhere, but if velocity is way up...that ramps up bugs anyway.

        • MajesticHobo2 an hour ago

          No, it's not a given. AI always finds security issues in the things I just had it write.

          • hparadiz 37 minutes ago

            This is true for human written code too. This is why in the future all written code MUST be run through an internal security sweep before being given to your harness for writing. That's just basic due diligence at this point.

            • catlifeonmars 16 minutes ago

              Yes but LLMs famously produce vastly more code than humans. My hot take: LLMs will produce more insecure code than they can catch, and will also find ways to smuggle insecure code to avoid extra work.

      • SOLAR_FIELDS 2 hours ago

        Do we have any evidence around the rate that AI emits security bugs vs humans previously? You would think that perhaps AI would be better about this, but perhaps not.

        • dvh an hour ago

          I'm making no claims. I'm just saying that contributing before ai was difficult so people rarely did it. Now that contributing is easy, more code will be added. More code = more bugs. Always.

          • voakbasda an hour ago

            Yet the opposite seems to be true. Many projects now shun new contributors due to AI.

            • punchmesan 29 minutes ago

              Eh I'm not sure that's an indicator that the opposite is true. Github's vastly increased commit activity is the best indicator we have of this. https://www.tomshardware.com/software/github-report-highligh...

              Sure, some projects are trying to be responsible or are trying to keep waves of slop PR's from drowning them, but that is by no means an indication of a general distaste for AI code. It's been largely embraced.

            • hparadiz 36 minutes ago

              I've run Daybreak against my human written pre-AI code and found so much stuff that I don't trust human or AI written code. It all MUST be audited by a security sweep AI.

        • the8472 an hour ago

          Even if Fable and Astra are superhuman at identifying and fixing bugs that does nothing when projects get bugslopped faster and cheaper by some low-end model.

      • tptacek an hour ago

        I hate these meta conversations on crunchy technical topics and feel like we should be digging into the KVM security model more than this general security prognostication stuff. Having said that, I will hypocritically further this debate by pointing out that the determinant of software security moving forward is not so whether AI is drastically better than humans at avoiding common vulnerability patterns, (or instead just a little better). Rather, it's that AI will make it much easier to move subsystems or whole projects to memory-safe programming languages and towards formal verification.

      • j45 an hour ago

        Existing code will have security holes that haven't been found yet.

    • InsidiousWombat 6 minutes ago

      ...if the pace of both fixing and finding bugs got accelerated, all we're in for is machines being on average more vulnerable (because patching takes time and effort and more bugs increases that)

    • TZubiri 13 minutes ago

      Have you ever been told that you are problematically optimistic?

  • gerdesj an hour ago

    404

  • fwsgonzo 2 hours ago

    Don't disable nested, it's still better security than everything else, and having it on means access to real hardware virtualization. Second, the article is AI-written. It really should be rewritten by a human.

    • xmodem an hour ago

      Outside of development and CI, I have yet to hear a compelling use case for nested virtualization.

      Agree that the article is downright painful to read though.

      • JoshTriplett an hour ago

        > I have yet to hear a compelling use case for nested virtualization.

        AWS instances are slow to launch; they take whole seconds. Nested virtualization allows running something like firecracker/crosvm/rust-vmm atop a normal AWS instance, without needing a bare-metal one.

        • tptacek an hour ago

          If you're segregating internal workloads, by all means use nested virtualization on EC2 or DO or something. Your threat model is different and you probably have a lot more room to maneuver when a KVM escape is announced, because you have some level of trust in all your workloads.

          If you're running multitenant for mutually-untrusting customers, that excuse goes out the window.

          • JoshTriplett an hour ago

            One distinction I'd make as well is "are you running more than one customer's workload on the same system" (yikes, don't), vs "are you using nested virt as additional protection rather than running the customer workload directly on an instance, but one instance only gets jobs from one customer".

            • necovek 14 minutes ago

              Does this hold for the likes of Amazon?

              Do your lambda functions always get a per-customer dedicated instance or is firecracker distributing them so that multiple customers can have VMs on the same actual box?

              Sounds like it would be pretty expensive for Amazon to dedicate an instance to every customer, especially for those with small workloads.

              If that's the case, why would it not hold for Amazon but would hold for everyone else?

              • swiftcoder 9 minutes ago

                > Do your lambda functions always get a per-customer dedicated instance

                At some point in the past they did, for pretty much exactly this reason. I'd assume they don't anymore (I last worked there a decade ago).

            • tptacek an hour ago

              Another good point, but this one is maybe a little less dispositive than it looks like: it's very difficult to engineer an orchestration system that reliably segregates worker physicals from each other, so I'd rate the likelihood of a game-over situation after a guest->host escape as very high regardless of how yuo schedule workloads. It's sort of the same situation as how SSRF's are usually game-overs (you're pivoting from a hardened attack surface to a much softer one) but even harder to engineer again.

              • JoshTriplett an hour ago

                That's fair. You'd want a system designed around the notion that every customer instance must be isolated from each other without the nested virtualization.

                (Aside: my current guess at the appropriate security posture towards Nitro Sandboxes, in the current era of vulnerabilities, is "decent, but probably has security holes too, and is less widely scrutinized, don't count on it either". Thoughts?)

                Any recommendations for good guides on that, besides "design very careful IAM policies and security groups, harden any common services they have access to, and ideally run them under separate AWS accounts"?

    • TZubiri 12 minutes ago

      ? If you don't use it, disable it. Simple as that

    • rootnod3 an hour ago

      > It really should be rewritten by a human.

      That does not seem to be what HN has been thinking for months.

  • arde 42 minutes ago

    That's a 404 now.

  • gbrindisi 2 hours ago

    Thinking about agents sandboxes... it truly seems like the time is ripe for unikernels

    • wmf 20 minutes ago

      Unikernels that run on KVM aren't going to protect against KVM escapes.

  • adverbly an hour ago

    Well this sucks. So this needs a kernel fix then? Looks like I can disable nested passthrough manually, but am I stuck waiting for downsteam fixes at this point then?

    Honestly, this gives me pause on the whole "VM is sufficient for any agentic sandbox environment" theory.

  • tptacek 2 hours ago

    Another nested KVM bug. We debated enabling nested KVM for many years, and held the line every time, because the only post-2020 KVM vulnerability we knew of required nested VMs. That decision aged well: we've gotten at least 2 more nested KVM escapes in the last year.

    Don't allow nested KVM.

    • rwmj an hour ago

      Certain Windows features need it unfortunately. Virtualization-Based Security (VBS), Credential Guard, Hyper-V (obviously), and I'm going to say WSL2(?)

      • tptacek an hour ago

        Right, sorry, that's a fair point (and Josh Triplett made another fair point earlier). I'm sort of implicitly locked in to the "hosting company" use case here: services running mutually-untrusting isolated workloads for customers.

  • Ungh 41 minutes ago
  • ArcHound 2 hours ago

    Surely, we'll run out of critical CVEs in open-source someday. Seems it's not today.

    In the meantime the patching will continue until security improves!

    • j45 an hour ago

      Doubt it, but there will be a big spike for a while and then slow down.

  • bigbuppo 21 minutes ago

    Looking forward to Ubuntu finally rolling out an updated kernel for this in the year 2057.

  • nubinetwork 2 hours ago

    I guess its time to shut off the internet.

  • calvinmorrison 2 hours ago

    what is the mitigation.

    • stilldavid an hour ago

      Look in the article under the headline "Mitigation".

      • pixl97 38 minutes ago

        Page has gone 404.

    • j45 an hour ago

      The cloud is somebody else's computer.

      Mitigations are layered, first not using a shared VPS, and instead running your own bare metal server with something like proxmox to run the containerization.

      Those containers could be susceptible to issues between them too, but you at least control the environment and can put more checks and balances in place.

      Shared cloud and vps is going to become bumpy and more insecure the next little while. There's no way around it.

  • FLeXMurphy 16 minutes ago

    Page is now 404'd.

  • k0morebi an hour ago

    404 now

    • pixl97 38 minutes ago

      Confirmed, wonder what happened here.