22 comments

  • JCBird1012 41 minutes ago

    In my opinion, all of these open source/free/open document signing tools are neat on paper (and technically fulfill the goal of being able to verify a document's chain-of-custody/signature provenance) - but won't take off in any meaningful way legally because there's no entity behind them taking the responsibility for accuracy and culpability.

    DocuSign/Adobe/whomever is trust anchor, it's an entity you can sue or subpoena if something goes wrong. Someone who's actually on the hook for making sure whatever's signed is accurate and truthful (outside of the reputational risk of fraud completely obliterating any trust in your platform)...

    No amount of cryptographic verification substitutes for having a legal person on the other end who can be held accountable for actually verifying the document was signed accurately/process was followed.

    • layer8 22 minutes ago

      Indeed. It doesn’t meet the requirements of EU qualified signatures or seals, for example.

    • hnscum 19 minutes ago

      that's true. i think that if it's obvious that the audit is finding everything, every detail, every file, piece of data touched.... at what level do we need to verify?

  • qurren an hour ago

    Nice idea but with all related things the ultimate question remains whether courts will actually recognize it.

    Currently courts will still consider paper-signed and scanned PDFs as legally binding, so any verification on top of that is superfluous to them.

    More realistically, you take an oauth when you take the stand at the court, and if a signed document was altered by the counterparty you'd say so truthfully, if it weren't, you'd say so truthfully, and the penalty of that oauth purjury is high enough that most people wouldn't do it. Cryptography not needed.

    • sscaryterry an hour ago

      This depends completely on the jurisdiction. This is simply not universally true.

  • eps 38 minutes ago

    Why not use RFC 3161?

    Due to how the code signing works, timestamping servers are provided by all major CAs with full public access, e.g. timestamp.digicert.com, timestamp.comodoca.com, timestamp.sectigo.com, etc.

    PS. OP, your comments are auto-killed for some reason. You may want to message mods to get this sorted.

  • evolve2k an hour ago

    Loved it until I saw its using Bitcoin. With proof of work doesn’t it tie this project to a bit of an environmental nitemare? Bitcoin isn’t the best place for this, no?

    I would have imagined Ethereum or some other ledger would have been better no?

    Anyone with more crypto ledger knowledge be able to say what I’m trying to say more precisely.

  • sandeepkd an hour ago

    Tried to poke a little to see if I can find any name (I could not). Challenge with this domain is the TRUST anchor. As an organization/company you have to establish yourself first (directly or through reference) otherwise its hard for anyone to trust you.

  • jkahrs595 an hour ago

    Any benefits over DocuSeal?

    https://github.com/docusealco/docuseal

  • mfkp an hour ago

    Looks interesting, but in order to actually compete with any e-signing platform you'll at the very least need to have templates with pre-filled information, an API to autofill docs with required information, and more field types. Right now for example, you can only add text, checkbox, and date/signature fields. Checkboxes are required to be checked (no making them optional), so if there are multiple checkbox options, they have to check them all to continue. Not very useful for actual e-signing flows.

  • conradludgate an hour ago

    I don't like the idea of this using bitcoin. I wonder if it's possible to build this off of regular PKI - certificate transparency logs for instance encode the proof of commitment, while the signature can be an X509 certificate.

  • 1123581321 an hour ago

    It’s a neat proof of concept, but it’s hard to see the organizations that care about certified documents adopting this. Inherently conservative. Let’s Encrypt invested a lot in their early partnerships and used that to sneak up on the conservative buyers and trusters of certs.

  • sscaryterry 2 hours ago

    I'd be very careful with this. Looks to me like an invented standard: https://letsseal.org/site/standard

    • j_rosenberg an hour ago

      Aren't all standards "invented"? Do you want to say that there is no a RFC page for the protocol?

      Edit: spelling

      • sscaryterry an hour ago

        Sure, lets say this lacks an RFC/ISO number, or any semblance of what is usually called a standard.

        • conradludgate an hour ago

          What I think you're trying to say, but don't seem to be getting across super clearly, is that this standard hasn't yet gone through an open third party review

  • rubyfan an hour ago

    I love the concept, it would be great to see broader uptake of an open standard for this sort of space.

    • nsokin an hour ago

      Thx. The spec matters more than the site here, its SPEC.md in the repo. Still v1.1 and cheap to change, so any/all notes welcome.

  • dpoloncsak 2 hours ago

    Poked around a bit..excited to see where this goes.

    Just a quick note, Under "Get help from the community > Disucssions", there's a 404 to https://github.com/letsseal/letsseal/discussions .

    The idea makes sense in principle I think, and but I'll be chewing on it a bit, haha. Seems like a solid standard, but you know how standards go.... (Relevant XKCD: https://xkcd.com/927/)

    I like that you kept a lot of the same commands/naming/syntax from LetsEncrypt. As someone familiar with LetsEncrypt, makes me feel like I'd slide right in here easily.

    I'd like to learn more about the 'Bitcoin anchored root'...is that part of RFC 6962 or something else entirely? Do you mean a 'Bitcoin-like blockchain' or are you using the actual BTC chain? Could you point me in the right direction?

  • sscaryterry 2 hours ago

    Is this PAdES B-B only? As far as I know, PAdES B-T requires a QTSP timestamp.